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An Integral Formulation and Convex Hull Pricing
for Unit Commitment
Yanan Yu, Yongpei Guan, and Yonghong Chen
Abstract—Reducing uplift payments has been a challenging
problem for most wholesale markets in US. The main difficulty
comes from the unit commitment discrete decision makings.
Recently convex hull pricing has shown promises to reduce the
uplift payments. However, it has been intractable to obtain the
optimal convex hull price. In this paper, we describe an innovative
approach to decide the optimal convex hull price by simply
solving a linear program. We also provide an example to illustrate
the calculation process. The final computational experiments on
a revised IEEE-118 bus system verify the cost effectiveness by
utilizing our proposed approach.
Index Terms—Uplift payments, Convex hull price, Integral
formulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
For most wholesale markets in US, Independent System
Operators (ISOs) collect the bids from the generation and
load sides, and then run the unit commitment and economic
dispatch problem (UCED) to decide the uniform market
clearing prices (MCPs) or local marginal prices (LMPs) for
transactions. A traditional approach is to calculate LMPs as
the value of the dual variables of the system-wide constraints
in the linear program relaxation of the UCED problem with the
integer variables fixed at their optimal values (called TLMP
method hereafter) [1]. As indicated in [1], [2], since the UC
problem is, in general, a mixed-integer program, in which the
convexity is not maintained. Thus, there could be no set of
uniform prices that supports a welfare-maximizing solution.
For instance, a generation unit could have a “lost opportunity
cost”, which is defined as the gap between a unit’s maximum
possible profit that could be obtained from self-scheduling
based on the given LMPs and the actual profit obtained
by following the ISO’s schedule. To address this issue, by
maintaining uniform energy prices based on marginal energy
costs, ISOs pay the side payments to units, so as to cover their
“lost opportunity costs”. This payment is referred to as “uplift”
payment. In other words, due to the non-convexity of the
UCED problems, there is a positive non-zero gap between the
objective value of the primal formulation used by ISOs and the
sum of the objectives of the profit maximization models used
by each market participant. ISOs need to pay this positive non-
zero gap, i.e., uplift payments, to the generation side market
participants to motivate their participation into the day-ahead
market. Since uplift payments lead to extra payments from
the load side, and non-transparency in the market clearing
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process, ISOs aim to minimize the uplift payments for their
daily operations.
To minimize the uplift payments, several pricing schemes
have been proposed. In [3], besides the uniform market price
calculated in the traditional method, a set of prices, such as
start-up price and capacity price, are derived from the dual
variables of the equations, in which the binary variables are
fixed at their optimal values in the UCED problem. This
pricing provides a Walrasian equilibrium and results in zero
profit for all suppliers, while it leads to uplift payments for
the generators whose marginal price is less than the market
clearing price as indicated in [1]. In [4], the author formulates
a direct minimum-uplift model for pricing pool-based auction
with network constraints, while the dispatch and commitment-
based profits and uplifts are assumed to be decoupled, i.e., no
ramping constraints of the generator are considered. Besides
the above two approaches, convex hull pricing approach was
introduced and also received significant attention [1], [5],
[6], [7]. This pricing approach aims to minimize the uplift
payments over all possible uniform prices, and also shows
that the uplift payment is essentially equal to the duality gap
between the UCED problem and its Lagrangian dual. Several
wholesale markets in US have implemented an approximation
of convex hull pricing. For instance, in the Midcontinent ISO,
it is named extended locational marginal prices (ELMP).
Although convex hull pricing approach is promising in
theory as indicated in [8], this method requires the optimal
Lagrangian multipliers for the mixed-integer UCED problem
over the whole operational horizon, which are computationally
expensive. The main difficulties lie in two aspects: 1) discrete
decision variables (on and off statuses of each generator)
in the formulation and 2) general convex functions of the
generation costs. To address these, significant progress has
been made in [6], among others, in which a convex hull
description for the UC polytope without considering ramping
is introduced and convex envelope is introduced to reformulate
the problem as a second-order cone programming. However,
the optimal solutions for the uplift payments minimization
problem described in [6] may not necessarily be at the extreme
points due to ramping constraints. In this paper, we derive an
integral formulation, as a complement to the one described
in [9] for the single-generator UC problem that can provide
an integral solution for a general single-generator UC problem
considering min-up/-down time, generation capacity, ramping
and variant start-up cost restrictions with a general convex cost
function by solving a linear program, which could overcome
the difficulties.
In the remaining part of this paper, we describe the integral
ii
formulation in Section II and further provide a complete proof
following a dynamic programming framework in Section III.
In Section IV, we describe the uplift payments minimiza-
tion formulation and show how the calculation of the uplift
payments minimization problem can be implemented through
solving a linear programming problem. Finally, in Section V,
we present an example to explore the insights and report
the computational experiment results on a revised IEEE-118
bus system, which verifies the effectiveness of our proposed
approach.
II. AN INTEGRAL FORMULATION FOR UNIT COMMITMENT
In this section, we introduce an integral formulation for a
single-generator UC problem with the generator to be initially
on. For a T -time period UC problem, the traditional 2-Bin
formulation for a single generator can be described as follows:
min
T∑
t=1
ft(xt, ut) +
T∑
t=t0+ℓ+1
ζt +
T−1∑
t=t0
ζ′t (1a)
s.t. ut = 1, ∀t ∈ [1, t0]Z, (1b)
t∑
i=t−L+1
vi ≤ ut, ∀t ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ L, T ]Z, (1c)
t∑
i=t−ℓ+1
vi ≤ 1− ut−ℓ, ∀t ∈ [t0 + ℓ, T ]Z, (1d)
ut − ut−1 − vt ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ [1, T ]Z, (1e)
−xt + Cut ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ [1, T ]Z, (1f)
xt − Cut ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ [1, T ]Z, (1g)
xt − xt−1 ≤ V ut−1 + V (1 − ut−1), ∀t ∈ [1, T ]Z, (1h)
xt−1 − xt ≤ V ut + V (1 − ut), ∀t ∈ [1, T ]Z, (1i)
ζ′t ≥ S
′(t+s0)(1− ut+1 −
t∑
s=1
(1− us)), ∀t ∈ [t0, T − 1]Z,(1j)
ζ′t ≥ S
′(t− k + 1)
(
vk −
t∑
s=k
(1− us)
)
,
∀t ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ L, T − 1]Z, k ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ 1, t− L+ 1]Z, (1k)
ζt ≥ S(t− k − 1)
(
vt −
t−1∑
s=k+1
us
)
,
∀t ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ 1, T ]Z, k ∈ [t0, t− ℓ − 1]Z, (1l)
ut, vt ∈ {0, 1}, ζt, ζ
′
t ≥ 0, u0 = 1, (1m)
where L, ℓ, C , C, V , and V represent the min-up time
limit, min-down time limit, the generation upper bound, the
generation lower bound, the start-up/shut-down ramp rate, and
the ramp-up/-down rate in the stable generation region. The
parameters S(·) and S′(·) represent the start-up and shut-
down costs determined by the start-up and shut-down times,
e.g. S(t − k + 1) and S′(t − k + 1) represent the start-up
and shut-down costs when the generator has been off and
on for (t − k + 1) time periods, respectively. The decision
variables ut, vt, xt, and ζt represent the generator’s on/off
status, start-up decision, generation amount, and start-up cost
at time t, respectively. The decision variable ζ′t represents
the shut-down cost when the generator shuts down at time
t + 1. The objective is to minimize the net total cost where
f(·) denotes the fuel cost minus the revenue as a function of
its electricity generation amount and electricity price. In this
study, we assume f(·) is piecewise linear with respect to x
and the generator has been initially on for s0 time periods
before time period 1. Then, the generator cannot shut down
until time t0+1, with t0 = [L−s0]
+, due to min-up constraints
(as indicated in constraint (1b)). For notation convenience, we
use [a, b]Z to represent the set of integers {a, a+1, . . . , b} and
the set [a, b]Z is empty if a > b.
This traditional formulation could not provide an integral
solution by solving it as a linear problem (i.e., relaxing the
integrality constraints for the binary variables). In this section,
we illustrate an alternative formulation which could provide
an integral solution for the binary variables by solving the
problem as a linear program.We first introduce the formulation
as follows and then provide the proof in the remaining part of
this section.
For the alternative formulation, we keep track of the consec-
utive “on” and “off” periods of each generator. We let binary
decision variable wt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, represent whether the
generator shuts down at time t+ 1 for the first time (wt = 1)
or not (wt = 0), wT shows whether the generator keeps on for
the whole time period, binary decision variable ytk, k ≤ T−1,
represent whether the generator starts up at t and shuts down
at k + 1 (ytk = 1) or not (ytk = 0), ytT represents whether
the generator starts up at t and keeps on till the end of the
horizon, binary decision variable ztk represent whether the
generator shuts down at time t+1 and starts up again at time
k (ztk = 1) or not (ztk = 0), and binary decision variable θt
represent whether the generator shuts down at time t+ 1 and
stays offline to the end (θt = 1) or not (θt = 0). We also let q
s
tk
be the generation amount at time s corresponding to the “on”
interval [t, k]Z. The corresponding net cost f
s
tk(q
s
tk) is usually
denoted as a convex function f¯ stk(q
s
tk) = αs(q
s
tk)
2+βsq
s
tk+cs
if only generation cost is involved or a convex function
f stk(q
s
tk) = αs(q
s
tk)
2+(βs−ps)q
s
tk+ cs if the electricity price
is also involved, say e.g., ps per unit power. Note here that
f¯ stk(q
s
tk) is a special case of f
s
tk(q
s
tk) with ps = 0. As indicated
above for f(·), f stk(q
s
tk) is also approximated by a piecewise
linear function. The corresponding formulation, named EUC
formulation, can be shown as follows:
min
T−1∑
t=t0
S′(t+s0)wt +
T−L∑
t=t0+ℓ+1
T−1∑
k=t+L−1
S′(k − t+ 1)ytk
+
∑
kt∈KT
S(t− k − 1)zkt +
∑
tk∈T K
k∑
s=t
φstk (2a)
s.t.
T∑
t=t0
wt = 1, (2b)
−wt +
T∑
k=t+ℓ+1
ztk −
t−L+1∑
k=t0+ℓ+1
ykt + θt = 0, ∀t ∈ [t0, T − 1]Z, (2c)
T∑
k=min{t+L−1,T}
ytk −
t−ℓ−1∑
k=t0
zkt = 0, ∀t ∈ [t0 + ℓ + 1, T ]Z, (2d)
Pwk ≤ q
s
tk ≤ Pwk, ∀s ∈ [t, k]Z, ∀tk ∈ T K
1, (2e)
iii
Pytk ≤ q
s
tk ≤ Pytk, ∀s ∈ [t, k]Z, ∀tk ∈ T K
2, (2f)
qttk ≤ V ytk, ∀tk ∈ T K
2, (2g)
qktk ≤ V wk, ∀tk ∈ T K
1, k ≤ T − 1 (2h)
qktk ≤ V ytk, ∀tk ∈ T K
2, k ≤ T − 1 (2i)
qs−1tk − q
s
tk ≤ V wk, q
s
tk − q
s−1
tk ≤ V wk,
∀s ∈ [t+ 1, k]Z, ∀tk ∈ T K
1, (2j)
qs−1tk − q
s
tk ≤ V ytk, q
s
tk − q
s−1
tk ≤ V ytk,
∀s ∈ [t+ 1, k]Z, ∀tk ∈ T K
2, (2k)
φstk−a
s
jq
s
tk≥b
s
jwk, ∀s ∈ [t, k]Z, j ∈ [1, N ]Z, ∀tk ∈ T K
1, (2l)
φstk−a
s
jq
s
tk≥b
s
jytk, ∀s ∈ [t, k]Z, j ∈ [1, N ]Z, ∀tk ∈ T K
2, (2m)
w, z, y ≥ 0, θt ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [t0, T − ℓ− 1]Z, (2n)
where T K = T K1∪T K2 with T K1 representing the set of all
possible combinations of t = 1 and each k ∈ [t0 + 1, T ]Z to
construct a time interval [t, k]Z, and T K
2 representing the set
of all possible combinations of each t ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ 1, T ]Z and
each k ∈ [min{t+L− 1, T }, T ]Z to construct a time interval
[t, k]Z. KT represents the set of all possible combinations of
each k ∈ [t0, T−ℓ−1]Z and each t ∈ [k+ℓ+1, T ]Z to construct
a time interval [k, t]Z. Constraints (2b)-(2d) keep track of the
“on” and “off” statuses of the unit. Constraints (2e)-(2f) repre-
sent the generation upper and lower bounds. Constraints (2g)-
(2i) represent the start-up and shut-down ramping restrictions.
Constraints (2j)-(2k) represent the ramp-up and ramp-down
restrictions. Constraints (2l)-(2m) represent the constraint form
for the piecewise linear convex function f stk(q
s
tk).
For notation brevity, in the next section, we define the
feasible region describing constraints (2b) to (2n) as set XI .
That is, XI = {(w, φ, θ, y, z, q) : Constraints (2b)− (2n)}. In
general, network flow formulations with side constraints and
convex cost functions cannot guarantee an integral solution.
However, due to the problem structure, this above alternative
formulation can provide an integral solution based on the
strong duality proof. In the following section, we provide the
corresponding proof.
III. THE DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING RESULT AND DUALITY
RELATIONSHIP
For the main part, we show that the EUC formulation is the
dual formulation of the primal dynamic programming formula-
tion. Now we describe the dynamic programming formulation
first. Without loss of generality, we assume the generator has
been initially online for s0 time periods. Accordingly, the
earliest shut-down time will be t0 + 1 with t0 = [L − s0]
+.
To make the dynamic programming more efficient, we define
two value functions, V↓(t) and V↑(t) for each time periods.
More specially, we let V↓(t) represent the net cost (generation
cost minus revenue) from time t to the end when the generator
shuts down at time t+1 (i.e., t is the last “on” period for the
current “on” interval),and V↑(t) represent the net cost from
time t to the end when the generator starts up at time t. Since
the generator will be on for consecutive time periods followed
by consecutive “off” time periods, we let V↓(t) and V↑(t)
keep track of the starting points for the “OFF” and “ON”
intervals. Accordingly, we let C(t, k) represent the net cost
in the interval [t, k]Z for the generator when the generator
starts up at time t and shuts down at time k+1, and C(t, T )
represents the net cost when the generator starts up at time t
and keeps online until the end of the horizon. Thus, we have
the following dynamic programming equations:
V↓(t) = min
k∈[t+ℓ+1,T ]Z
{S(k − t− 1) + V↑(k), 0},
∀t ∈ [t0, T − ℓ− 1]Z, (3a)
V↓(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [T − ℓ, T ]Z, (3b)
V↑(t) = min
k∈[t+L−1,T−1]Z
{S′(k − t+ 1) + C(t, k) + V↓(k),
C(t, T )}, ∀t ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ 1, T − L]Z, (3c)
V↑(t) = C(t, T ), ∀t ∈ [T − L+ 1, T ]Z, (3d)
where equations (3a) indicate that when the generator shuts
down at time t+1, it can either start up again at time k with
k − t − 1 ≥ ℓ and k ≤ T or keep offline throughout all the
remaining time periods. Equations (3c) indicate that when the
generator starts up at time t, it can either keep online until time
k with k− t+1 ≥ L and k ≤ T −1 or keep online throughout
all the remaining time periods. Following the shut-down (resp.
start-up) profile, our shut-down (resp. start-up) function can
capture the length of online (resp. offline) time before shutting
down (resp. starting up). Equations (3b) describe that the
generator cannot start up again after it shuts down at t + 1
with T − ℓ ≤ t ≤ T due to the min-down time limit and
equations (3d) describe that the generator must keep online
throughout all the remaining time periods if it starts up at
time t with T −L+ 1 ≤ t ≤ T due to the min-up time limit.
As we consider the deterministic UC problem from times
1 to T and assume the generator has been online for s0 time
periods, our goal is to find out the value of the following
function:
z = V↑(0) :=min
t∈[t0,T−1]Z
{
S′(t+ s0) + C(1, t) + V↓(t), C(1, T )
}
. (4)
The corresponding optimal solution can be obtained by trac-
ing the candidates for each optimal value function backwards
from V↑(T ).
In this paper, instead of using dynamic programming to
solve the problem efficiently, we use it to derive an extended
formulation for the deterministic UC problem. By incorporat-
ing the dynamic programming equations (i.e., (3a) - (3d) and
(4)) as constraints, we obtain the following equivalent linear
program:
max Φ (5a)
(wt) s.t.Φ ≤ S
′(t+s0)+ C(1, t) + V↓(t),∀t ∈ [t0, T−1]Z,(5b)
(wt) Φ ≤ C(1, T ), (5c)
(zkt) V↓(k) ≤ S(t− k − 1) + V↑(t),
∀t ∈ [k + ℓ+ 1, T ]Z, ∀k ∈ [t0, T− ℓ−1]Z,(5d)
(θt) V↓(t) ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ [t0, T − ℓ− 1]Z, (5e)
(θt) V↓(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [T − ℓ, T ]Z, (5f)
(ytk) V↑(t) ≤ S
′(k − t+ 1) + C(t, k) + V↓(k),
∀k ∈ [t+ L− 1, T − 1]Z, ∀t ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ 1, T − L]Z,(5g)
(ytT ) V↑(t) ≤ C(t, T ), ∀t ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ 1, T − L]Z, (5h)
iv
(ytT ) V↑(t) = C(t, T ), ∀t ∈ [T − L+ 1, T ]Z. (5i)
Note here that the optimal value functions in the dynamic
program framework become decision variables in the above
formulation. To obtain the value V↑(0) under the dynamic pro-
gramming framework, it is equivalent to maximizing variable
z in the linear program above.
Since the above linear program cannot be solved directly as
C(t, k) (the objective value of the economic dispatch problem)
is unknown for each pair (t, k), we first show how to obtain
the value of C(t, k) by discussing two cases: (i) k ≤ T − 1
and (ii) k = T , respectively.
When k ≤ T − 1, if t > 1, we have the following
formulation to calculate C(t, k) with (t, k) given:
C(t, k) = min
k∑
s=t
φs (6a)
(λ−s ) s.t. −xs ≤ −C, ∀s ∈ [t, k]Z, (6b)
(λ+s ) xs ≤ C, ∀s ∈ [t, k]Z, (6c)
(µt) xt ≤ V , (6d)
(µk) xk ≤ V , (6e)
(σ−s ) xs − xs−1 ≤ V, ∀s ∈ [t+ 1, k]Z, (6f)
(σ+s ) xs−1 − xs ≤ V, ∀s ∈ [t+ 1, k]Z, (6g)
(δsj) φs ≥ a
s
jxs + b
s
j , ∀s ∈ [t, k]Z, j ∈ [1, N ]Z.(6h)
If t = 1, we have the corresponding formulation by
removing constraint (6d) as the generator is initially on from
the initial state. When k = T , we have the corresponding
formulation by removing constraint (6e) as the generator is not
required to shut down at time T+1 if it stays online until time
T . Note here that we have assumed the net cost function to be
piecewise linear. It could be indicated by constraints (6h) with
N pieces. More specifically, here we use continuous variable
φs to represent the net cost at time s, while a
s
j and b
s
j are the
slope and intercept of the jth piece of the net cost function at
time s, respectively.
Now, we can incorporate the economic dispatch constraints
(e.g., (6b) - (6h)) into our proposed linear program (5), we
take the dual of the economic dispatch model (6) and embed
its dual formulation into model (5). For instance, for k ≤ T−1,
we have the dual formulation as follows.
C(t, k) = max
k∑
s=t
(
λ+s C − λ
−
s C
)
+ V (µt + µk)
+
k∑
s=t+1
V
(
σ+s + σ
−
s
)
+
k∑
s=t
N∑
j=1
bsjδsj (7a)
(qttk) s.t.λ
+
t − λ
−
t + µt − σ
−
t+1 + σ
+
t+1 −
N∑
j=1
atjδtj = 0,(7b)
(qktk) λ
+
k − λ
−
k + µk + σ
−
k − σ
+
k −
N∑
j=1
akj δkj = 0,(7c)
(qstk) λ
+
s − λ
−
s + σ
−
s − σ
−
s+1 − σ
+
s + σ
+
s+1
−
N∑
j=1
asjδsj = 0, ∀s ∈ [t+ 1, k − 1]Z, (7d)
(φstk)
N∑
j=1
δsj = 1, ∀s ∈ [t, k]Z, (7e)
λ±s ≤ 0, ∀s ∈ [t, k]Z,
µt ≤ 0, µk ≤ 0, σ
±
s ≤ 0, ∀s ∈ [t+ 1, k]Z,
δsj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ [1, N ]Z, s ∈ [t, k]Z, (7f)
where λ−s and λ
+
s are dual variables corresponding to con-
straints (6b) and (6c), respectively, µt and µk are the dual vari-
ables corresponding to constraint (6d) and (6e), respectively,
σ−s and σ
+
s are dual variables corresponding to constraints (6f)
and (6g), respectively, and δsj are dual variables corresponding
to constraints (6h). Note that all of these dual variables are
correspondingly labeled in the brackets of the left hand side
of (6) for an easy reference. For k = T , we obtain the
corresponding dual formulation by removing the dual variable
µk from model (7). Thus, in the following part of this section,
we refer to (7) as the dual formulation for all possible k,
where µk will be removed from (7) when k = T . Now we
obtain an alternative linear program, as shown in the following,
by plugging the dual formulation of the economic dispatch
problem and redefining C(t, k) to be a decision variable in
the following model.
max Φ (8a)
s.t. (5b)− (5i), (8b)
(ptk) C(1, k) ≤
k∑
s=1
(
λ+s C − λ
−
s C
)
+ V µk
+
k∑
s=2
V
(
σ+s + σ
−
s
)
+
k∑
s=1
N∑
j=1
bsjδsj ,
∀k ∈ [t0 + 1, T − 1]Z, (8c)
(ptk) C(t, k) ≤
k∑
s=t
(
λ+s C − λ
−
s C
)
+ V (µt + µk)
+
k∑
s=t+1
V
(
σ+s + σ
−
s
)
+
k∑
s=t
N∑
j=1
bsjδsj ,
∀k ∈ [t+ L− 1, T − 1]Z, ∀t ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ 1, T − L]Z,(8d)
(ptk) C(t, T ) ≤
T∑
s=t
(
λ+s C − λ
−
s C
)
+ V µt
+
T∑
s=t+1
V
(
σ+s + σ
−
s
)
+
T∑
s=t
N∑
j=1
bsjδsj ,
∀t ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ 1, T ]Z, (8e)
(ptk) C(1, T ) ≤
T∑
s=1
(
λ+s C − λ
−
s C
)
+
T∑
s=2
V
(
σ+s + σ
−
s
)
+
T∑
s=1
N∑
j=1
bsjδsj , (8f)
(7b)− (7f),
∀t ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ 1, T ]Z, ∀k ∈ [min{t+ L− 1, T }, T ]Z.(8g)
Note here that the right-hand-sides of constraints (8c) to (8f)
correspond to the objective function (7a) under four different
cases: 1) t = 1, k ∈ [t0 + 1, T − 1]Z, 2) t ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ 1, T −
vL]Z,k ∈ [t + L − 1, T − 1]Z, 3) t ∈ [t0 + ℓ + 1, T ]Z, k = T
and 4) the case in which t = 1, k = T .
In the following, we present an integral polytope for the
original deterministic UC model (1). Before that, we take the
dual of the above linear program (8) and obtain the following
dual linear program:
min
T−1∑
t=t0
S′(t+s0)wt +
T−L∑
t=t0+ℓ+1
T−1∑
k=t+L−1
S′(k − t+ 1)ytk
+
∑
kt∈KT
S(t− k − 1)zkt +
∑
tk∈T K
k∑
s=t
φstk
s.t.
T∑
t=t0
wt = 1, (9a)
−wt +
T∑
k=t+ℓ+1
ztk −
t−L+1∑
k=t0+ℓ+1
ykt + θt = 0, ∀t ∈ [t0, T−1]Z,(9b)
T∑
k=min{t+L−1,T}
ytk −
t−ℓ−1∑
k=t0
zkt = 0, ∀t ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ 1, T ]Z,(9c)
ptk − wk = 0, ∀tk ∈ T K
1, (9d)
ptk − ytk = 0, ∀tk ∈ T K
2, (9e)
qstk ≤ Cptk, ∀s ∈ [t, k]Z, ∀tk ∈ T K, (9f)
−qstk ≤ −Cptk, ∀s ∈ [t, k]Z, ∀tk ∈ T K, (9g)
qttk ≤ V ptk, ∀tk ∈ T K
2, (9h)
qktk ≤ V ptk, ∀tk ∈ T K, k ≤ T − 1 (9i)
qs−1tk − q
s
tk ≤ V ptk, ∀s ∈ [t+ 1, k]Z, ∀tk ∈ T K, (9j)
qstk − q
s−1
tk ≤ V ptk, ∀s ∈ [t+ 1, k]Z, ∀tk ∈ T K, (9k)
φstk − a
s
jq
s
tk ≥ b
s
jptk,∀s ∈ [t, k]Z,j ∈ [1, N ]Z, ∀tk ∈ T K,(9l)
w, z, p, y ≥ 0, θt ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [t0, T − ℓ− 1]Z. (9m)
In the above dual formulation, dual variables w, z, θ and y
(labeled in the brackets of the left-hand-side of (5)) correspond
to constraints (5b) – (5i), respectively, and dual variables q, φ,
and p (labeled in the brackets of the left-hand-side of (7) and
(8)) correspond to constraints (8c) – (8g) for each tk ∈ T K,
respectively.
After replacing p with w or y (due to (9d) and (9e)) in
the dual formulation (9), we obtain the cleaner model (2) as
described in Section II.
Now, based on the above analysis, we can show that the
polytope (2b) – (2m) is an integral polytope in the following
Theorem, which indicates that the extreme points of the
polytope are integral. To prove this statement, we use the
following proposition in [10].
Proposition 1 ([10]): For A ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ Rm, let
X = {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≤ b, xj ∈ B, j ∈ J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}. (10)
If X is bounded, then the inequalities in (10) describe the
convex hull of X if and only if for all c ∈ Rn, the linear
program zLP = max{cx : Ax ≤ b} has an optimal solution
x∗ ∈ X .
Theorem 1: The alternative formulation (2), named EUC,
provides an integral formulation for the deterministic Unit
Commitment problem (1), i.e., leads to binary solutions with
respect to decision variables w, y, z and θ, by solving the
problem as a linear program.
Proof: Note here that, first it is easy to observe that
formulation (2) is a valid formulation for the deterministic
UC problem (1). We now show that the extreme points for
the polytope (2b)-(2n) are binary with respect to decision
variables w, y, z and θ. For notation brevity, we denote (2a) as
min c⊤(w, y, z, θ, q, φ) where c is the column vector including
all coefficients in (2a). Now we prove that for any value of
c, we can provide an optimal solution that is integral with
respect to w, y, z, θ to the linear program with (2a) as the
objective function and (2b)-(2n) as constraints, which means
that Theorem 1 holds.
Following the dynamic programming algorithm (3)-(4), we
can obtain an optimal solution for any given c. Based on this
optimal solution, which indicates the online/offline status and
generation amount of the generator at each time period, we
construct a solution (w∗, y∗, z∗, θ∗, q∗, φ∗) as follows:
1) w∗t = 1 if the generator shuts down for the first time at
time t+ 1 and w∗t = 0 otherwise, ∀t ∈ [0, T − 1].
2) w∗T = 1 if the generator stays online for all the time
periods and w∗T = 0 otherwise.
3) y∗tk = 1 if the generator starts up at time t and shuts
down at time k + 1, and y∗tk = 0 otherwise.
4) y∗tT = 1 if the generator starts up at time t and stays
online to the end and y∗tT = 0 otherwise.
5) z∗tk = 1 if the generator shuts down at time t + 1 and
starts up at time k and z∗tk = 0 otherwise.
6) θ∗t = 1 if the generator shuts down at time t+1 and stays
offline to the end and θ∗t = 0 otherwise.
7) qs∗tk takes the value of optimal generation output for each
s ∈ [t, k]Z if the generator starts up at time t and shuts
down at time k + 1 and qs∗tk = 0 otherwise, when t > 1.
It takes the value of optimal generation output for each
s ∈ [t, k]Z if the generator keeps on from the initial state
and shuts down at time k + 1 and qs∗tk = 0 otherwise,
when t = 1.
8) φs∗tk takes the value of optimal net cost for each s ∈
[t, k]Z, which is equal to maxj∈[1,N ]{a
s
jq
s∗
tk+b
s
jwk} when
tk ∈ T K1 and equal to maxj∈[1,N ]{a
s
jq
s∗
tk + b
s
jytk} when
tk ∈ T K2.
In the following, we show that (w∗, y∗, z∗, θ∗, q∗, φ∗) is an
optimal solution of model (2) with objective function (2a) and
constraints (2b)-(2n).
We first verify the feasibility. Since exact one w∗t = 1 for
t ∈ [t0, T ]Z, constraint (2b) is satisfied. For each t ∈ [t0, T −
1]Z in constraints (2c), we consider the following two possible
cases:
1) w∗t = 0 and y
∗
kt = 0 for all k ∈ [t0 + ℓ+ 1, T ]Z: for this
case, by definition, θ∗t = 0 and z
∗
tk = 0 for all possible
k ∈ [t+ ℓ+ 1, T ]Z.
2) w∗t = 1 or y
∗
kt = 1 for some k ∈ [t0 + ℓ + 1, T ]Z: for
this case, the generator shuts down at time t+1. We can
discuss this in two cases:
(i) If t ≥ T − ℓ,
∑T
k=t+ℓ+1 z
∗
tk + θ
∗
t reduces to θt. In
this case, the generator must satisfy the min-down time
vi
constraints in the dynamic programming framework,
and stay offline to the end, which indicates θ∗t = 1.
(ii) If t < T − ℓ, the generator either stays offline to the
end, which indicates θ∗t = 1 and z
∗
tk = 0 for all
possible k ∈ [t+ℓ+1, T ]Z, or starts up after satisfying
the min-down time limit, which indicates θ∗t = 0 and∑T
k=t+ℓ+1 z
∗
tk = 1.
For both cases, constraints (2c) are satisfied.
For each t ∈ [t0+ℓ+1, T ]Z in constraints (2d), we consider
the following two possible cases:
1) z∗kt = 0 for all k ∈ [t0, t− ℓ−1]Z: For this case, we have
ytk
∗ = 0 for all k ∈ [min{t+ L− 1, T }, T ]Z.
2) z∗kt = 1 for some k ∈ [t0, t − ℓ − 1]Z: For this case, the
generator starts up at time t. We can discuss this in two
cases:
(i) If t > T −L,
∑T
k=min{t+L−1,T} y
∗
tk reduces to y
∗
tT . In
this case, the generator must satisfy the min-up time
constraints and stay online to the end, which indicates
y∗tT = 1.
(ii) If t ≤ T − L,
∑T
k=min{t+L−1,T} y
∗
tk reduces to∑T
k=t+L−1 y
∗
tk. In this case, the generator either stays
online to the end, which indicates y∗tT = 1 and
y∗tk = 0, ∀k ∈ [t+L− 1, T − 1]Z, or shuts down again
after satisfying the min-up time limit, which indicates
that
∑T−1
k=t+L−1 y
∗
tk = 1 and y
∗
tT = 0.
For both cases, constraints (2d) are satisfied.
Constraints (2e)-(2m) are immediately satisfied based on
the construction of our solution and the definition of the
economic dispatch problem. Also, constraints (2n) are satisfied
obviously.
We then verify the optimality. We claim that the value of
the objective function (2a) for the constructed solution equals
to the objective value of the dynamic programming algorithm
(3)-(4) as follows.
T−1∑
t=t0
S′(t+s0)w
∗
t +
T−L∑
t=t0+ℓ+1
T−1∑
k=t+L−1
S′(k − t+ 1)y∗tk
+
∑
kt∈KT
S(t− k − 1)z∗kt +
∑
tk∈T K
k∑
s=t
φs∗tk
= S′(t1+s0) +
∑
tk∈T K2:y∗
tk
=1,k≤T−1,t≤T−L
S′(k − t+ 1) +
∑
kt∈KT :z∗
kt
=1
S(t− k − 1)
+
∑
tk∈T K1:w∗
k
=1
k∑
s=t
φs∗tk +
∑
tk∈T K2:y∗
tk
=1
k∑
s=t
φs∗tk (11a)
= S′(t1+s0) +
∑
tk∈T K2:y∗
tk
=1,k≤T−1,t≤T−L
S′(k − t+ 1) +
∑
kt∈KT :z∗
kt
=1
S(t− k − 1)
+
∑
tk∈T K1:w∗
k
=1
C(t, k) +
∑
tk∈T K2:y∗
tk
=1
C(t, k) (11b)
= V↑(0), (11c)
where t1 in (11a) indicates the first shut-down time, i.e., w
∗
t1
=
1. Equations (11a) and (11b) hold due to the construction of
φs∗tk . We discuss it in the following two cases:
1) When y∗tk = 0 or w
∗
k = 0, q
s∗
tk = 0 due to constraints (2e)-
(2f), which force φs∗tk = 0 in the minimization problem.
Based on the dynamic programming algorithm, we know
C(t, k) = 0 if the generator does not start up at time t
and shut down at time k + 1.
2) When y∗tk = 1 or w
∗
k = 1, φ
s∗
tk is forced to be
maxj∈[1,N ]{a
s
jq
s∗
tk + b
s
j} when tk ∈ T K
1 ∪ T K2 in
the minimization problem. Based on the dynamic
programming algorithm, we know C(t, k) =∑k
s=tmaxj∈[1,N ]{a
s
jx
∗
s + b
s
j}. Since x
∗
s = q
s∗
tk based on
the construction, it is clear that
∑
tk∈T K1:w∗
k
=1 C(t, k) =∑
tk∈T K1:w∗
k
=1
∑k
s=t φ
s∗
tk ,
∑
tk∈T K2:y∗
tk
=1 C(t, k) =∑
tk∈T K2:y∗
tk
=1
∑k
s=t φ
s∗
tk .
Equation (11c) holds because (w∗, y∗, z∗, θ∗, q∗) is con-
structed based on the optimal solution of the dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm (3) – (4) and is actually the expansion of
the objective function in (4). By the Strong Duality Theorem,
the constructed solution (w∗, y∗, z∗, θ∗, q∗, φ∗) is an optimal
solution for model (2).
From the above analysis, we notice that
(w∗, y∗, z∗, θ∗, q∗, φ∗) is binary with respect to w, y, z
and θ and optimal for the dual program for all possible cost
coefficient c.
Thus, we have proved our claim.
Further, the construction of the solutions builds a bridge
between the original space of the deterministic UC problem
and the extended reformulation (2). The following proposition
can be derived directly.
Proposition 2: If (w∗, y∗, z∗, θ∗, q∗, φ∗) is an optimal solu-
tion to the dual program (2), then
x∗s =
∑
tk∈T K,t≤s≤k
qs∗tk , u
∗
s =
∑
tk∈T K1,k≥s
w∗k +
∑
tk∈T K2,t≤s≤k
y∗tk,
v∗s =
∑
kt∈KT ,t=s
z∗kt, ∀s ∈ [1, T ]Z (12)
is an optimal solution to the deterministic UC problem (1).
Remark 1: If the generator is originally off for s−0 time units,
the earliest start-up time will be t−0 with t
−
0 = [ℓ− s
−
0 + 1]
+,
and we need to capture the first start-up time t instead of the
first shut-down time t in the initial-on case. We can redefine the
binary decision variable wt to represent whether the generator
being offline for the whole operational horizon. We can apply
the similar dynamic programming framework to obtain the
corresponding formulation by the following adjustments:
1) Change the item considering wt in the objective function
to
∑T
t=t−
0
S(s−0 + t− 1)wt.
2) Modify the constraint (2b) as
∑T
t=t−
0
wt = 1.
3) Modify the constraint (2c) as
T∑
k=t+ℓ+1
ztk −
t−L+1∑
k=t−
0
ykt+ θt = 0, ∀t ∈ [t
−
0+L− 1, T − ℓ− 1]Z
(13)
4) Modify the constraint (2d) as
T∑
k=min{t+L−1,T}
ytk −
t−ℓ−1∑
k=t−
0
+L−1
zkt − wt = 0, ∀t ∈ [t
−
0 , T ]Z
(14)
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5) Since the initial on-period sets T K1 does not exist in
initial off case, the constraints (2e) (2h) (2j) (2l) can
be deleted, and T K (as well as T K2) represents all
of the on-period time interval [t, k]Z, which contains all
possible combinations of each pair of t ∈ [t−0 , T ]Z and
k ∈ [min{t+ L− 1, T }, T ]Z.
Remark 2: Note here that our extended formulation ap-
proach can be applied to the case in which the problem param-
eters, including capacity and ramping rate, are dynamic. The
symmetric ramping rates and constant parameters are assumed
for symbolic simplification.
IV. UPLIFT PAYMENTS MINIMIZATION
The system optimization problem for a T -period UC prob-
lem (with Λ representing the set of generators) without consid-
ering transmission constraints run by an ISO can be abstracted
as follows (defined as MEUC):
Z∗
QIP
= min
wj ,ψj ,θj,yj ,zj ,qj
∑
j∈Λ
gj(w
j , ψj , θj , yj , zj , qj)(15)
s.t.
∑
j∈Λ
∑
tk∈T K
qjtk = d, (16)
(wj , ψj , θj , yj , zj , qj) ∈ X jI , ∀j ∈ Λ, (17)
wj , yj and zj are binary, ∀j ∈ Λ, (18)
where X jI is the feasible region for EUC formulation for
generator j with ψ (mirror of φ) being the generation cost. Let
Z∗
QP
be the optimal objective value of the above formulation
without the binary restriction constraints (18). It is easy to
observe that Z∗
QIP
≥ Z∗
QP
because the latter is the objective
value of a relaxed problem. Now we consider the profit
maximization problem of each generator. For a given price
vector π offered by the ISO, the profit maximization problem
for each generator can be described as follows:
vj(π) = max
wj ,ψj ,θj,yj ,zj ,qj
πT
∑
tk∈T K
qjtk − gj(w
j , ψj , θj , yj , zj , qj) (19)
s.t. (wj , ψj , θj , yj , zj , qj) ∈ X jI , (20)
wj , yj and zj are binary. (21)
On the other hand, the profit generator j can
obtain following the ISO’s schedule is equal to
πT
∑
tk∈T K q¯
j
tk − gj(w¯
j , ψ¯j , θ¯j , y¯j , z¯j , q¯j), defined as
v¯j(π), where (w¯
j , ψ¯j, θ¯j , y¯j , z¯j , q¯j) is an optimal solution for
generator j in the system optimization problem corresponding
to Z∗
QIP
.
Since vj(π) is no smaller than v¯j(π), there is a lost
opportunity cost (LOC) of each generator following the ISO
for each generator. Uplift payments are triggered as described
in [1] and [6] and can be represented as the following form:
Uj(π, w¯
j , ψ¯j , θ¯j , y¯j , z¯j , q¯j) =
vj(π)− (π
T
∑
tk∈T K
q¯jtk − gj(w¯
j , ψ¯j , θ¯j , y¯j , z¯j , q¯j)).(22)
To reduce the discrepancy, we need to find an optimal price π
that minimizes the total uplift cost paid by the ISO. That is,
we want to
minπ
∑
j∈Λ
Uj(π, w¯
j , ψ¯j , θ¯j , y¯j , z¯j, q¯j) (23)
=minπ
∑
j∈Λ
(vj(π)−(π
T
∑
tk∈T K
q¯jtk − gj(w¯
j , ψ¯j , θ¯j , y¯j , z¯j , q¯j)))(24)
=minπ
∑
j∈Λ
gj(w¯
j , ψ¯j , θ¯j , y¯j , z¯j , q¯j)− (πT d−
∑
j∈Λ
vj(π)),(25)
where (24) follows from (22) and (25) follows from (16). The
above (25) is equivalent to solving the following maximization
problem, since
∑
j∈Λ gj(w¯
j , ψ¯j , θ¯j , y¯j , z¯j , q¯j) is a fixed value
(the total generation cost for the system), as indicated in [1]:
maxπ π
Td−
∑
j∈Λ
vj(π)
= maxπ π
Td−∑
j∈Λ
( max
wj ,ψj ,θj,yj ,zj ,qj
πT
∑
tk∈T K
qjtk−gj(w
j , ψj , θj , yj , zj , qj))
s.t. (wj , ψj , θj , yj , zj , qj) ∈ X jI , (26)
wj , yj and zj are binary. (27)
= maxπ
∑
j∈Λ
( min
wj ,ψj ,θj,yj ,zj ,qj
gj(w
j , ψj , θj , yj , zj , qj)
−πT
∑
tk∈T K
qjtk) + π
Td (28)
s.t. (wj , ψj , θj , yj , zj , qj) ∈ X jI , (29)
wj , yj and zj are binary. (30)
It is easy to observe that model (28)–(30) is essentially the
Lagrangian relaxation of the original problem (15)-(18) to
obtain Z∗
QIP
and the corresponding optimal value π, i.e., π∗,
is the optimal convex hull price.
Based on Theorem 1, we can conclude that con-
straints (21), (27), and (30) can be relaxed. Thus, since (15)-
(17) is a linear program and (28)-(29) is a Lagrangian re-
laxation of (15)-(17), due to strong duality theorem, we can
solve the linear program (15)-(17) and the optimal convex hull
price π∗ is equal to the dual value corresponding to the load
balance constraints (16). We highlight this main conclusion in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2: If the generation cost function f¯ stk(q
s
tk) is
convex and approximated by a piecewise linear function, then
the optimal convex hull price can be obtained by solving the
linear program (15)-(17) and the optimal convex hull price
is equal to the dual values corresponding to the load balance
constraints (16).
V. CASE STUDY
We first illustrate the MEUC formulation using an example
in which two generators (G1 and G2) serve the loads in three
periods (d1 = 40MW, d2 = 80MW, and d3 = 60MW).
For G1, there are no start-up cost and binary decisions. The
generation bounds are C1 = 0 and C1 = 40MW. The unit
generation cost in each time period is c1 = $4/MWh, c2 =
$5/MWh, and c3 = $6/MWh. For G2, we have C2 = 20MW,
C2 = 100MW, V 2 = 55MW/h, V2 = 5MW/h and L2 = ℓ2 =
2. The start-up cost for G2 is $100. The convex generation
cost for G2 is approximated by a two-piece piecewise linear
function (e.g., ψ ≥ 20u + 4x and ψ ≥ −40u + 5x). We
assume s0 ≥ L2 for G2, which indicates that the min-up time
constraints have been satisfied.
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We have the optimal objective value Z∗
QIP
= $835 with the
optimal solution x¯11 = 0, x¯
1
2 = 35, x¯
1
3 = 10, x¯
2
1 = 40, x¯
2
2 =
45, x¯23 = 50 for both the original 2-Bin and our MEUC
formulations. The corresponding LMPs are π11 = 1, π
1
2 = 5,
and π13 = 6 (the optimal dual values corresponding to the
load balance constraints in solving the economic dispatch
problem when the unit commitment is fixed). Meanwhile,
we have Z 2B
QP
= $808.18 (the optimal objective value for
the 2-Bin LP relaxation model) with the corresponding dual
values π21 = 3.45, π
2
2 = 5, and π
2
3 = 5 and Z
∗
QP
= $828
with the corresponding dual values π31 = 1.7, π
3
2 = 5,
and π33 = 6 (the corresponding nonzero fractional solution
is x11 = 0, x
1
2 = 36, x
1
3 = 12, q
21
11 = 0, q
21
12 = 0, q
21
13 =
40, q2212 = 0, q
22
13 = 44, q
23
13 = 48, q
23
33 = 0, y
2
33 = 0, z
2
03 =
0, w20 = 0.2, w
2
1 = w
2
2 = 0, w
2
3 = 0.8, θ
2
0 = 0.2, θ
2
1 = θ
2
2 =
0, θ23 = 0.8). Using π
1, π2, and π3 as the input for (28)-(29),
combining (25), we can obtain the uplift payments to be $35,
$26.82, and $7, respectively, which shows that the convex hull
price provided by the MEUC formulation leads to the smallest
uplift payments and further, we only need to solve a linear
program to achieve this.
We further use a modified IEEE 118-bus system, based on
the one given online at motor.ece.iit.edu/data, to to evaluate the
performance of the MEUC formulation. The system contains
54 generators and 118 buses. The formulation was coded
in Python and solved using Gurobi 8.0.1. All experiments
were implemented on a PC with Intel Core i7-6500U CPU
at 2.50GHz and 8GB memory. In our experiment, we let
the operational horizon be 24 hours and the terminating
mixed integer programming optimality gap be 0.01%. To
generate more instances, corresponding to each nominal load
dt, t = 1, . . . , 24, we construct 10 instances with the load for
each instance uniformly distributed in [0.9dt, 1.1dt].
For each instance, we derive the price and the uplift pay-
ments under this price using three different pricing methods:
1) TLMP method stated in Section I.
2) Approximated CHP-Primal method proposed in [6].
3) MEUC formulation (15)-(18) defined in Section IV.
The computational results are reported in Table I. In the
table, Case 0 represents the nominal load case, and Cases
1 − 10 represent the ten generated variations of the nominal
load case. The uplift payments under TLMP method, ap-
proximated CHP-Primal method, and MEUC formulation are
presented under the columns labelled “UTLMP($)”, “UACHP($)”,
and “UMEUC($)”, respectively. The gaps between the uplift
payments under MEUC formulation and that of the other two
methods are calculated to show the improvement of MEUC
formulation. Column “GapTM(%)” represents the gap between
UTLMP and UMEUC, and column “GapCM(%)” shows the gap
between UACHP and UMEUC. More specifically, the gaps are
calculated as follows:
GapTM =
UTLMP − UMEUC
UTLMP
× 100%
GapCM =
UACHP − UMEUC
UACHP
× 100%
From Table I, we can observe that for all cases, the
MEUC formulation results in the least uplift payments. The
TABLE I
THE COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS FOR MODIFIED 118 CASES
Case UTLMP($) UACHP($) UMEUC($) GapTM(%) GapCM(%)
0 132 71 46 65.2 35.2
1 1480 775 259 82.5 66.6
2 1397 408 261 81.3 35.9
3 514 373 124 75.8 66.7
4 2714 608 244 91.0 59.9
5 4299 1478 616 85.7 58.3
6 2693 971 481 82.1 50.4
7 3293 1531 1143 65.3 25.3
8 952 356 90 90.5 74.6
9 4027 1064 549 86.4 48.4
10 5780 1038 671 88.4 35.3
large savings are observed between the TLMP method and
the MEUC formulations because the TLMP method cannot
incorporate the start-up and no-load costs of the generators.
What is more, the uplift payments generated from the approx-
imated CHP-Primal formulation are also larger than that from
our proposed MEUC formulation, because the approximated
CHP-Primal formulation only approximated the convex hull
formulation for each UC since the ramping constraints and
time-dependent start-up costs are not captured in their model.
On the other hand, our MEUC formulation provides the convex
hull description for each individual UC.
Finally, we notice here that the uplift payments generated
by our proposed MEUC model is small, but it is not equal to
zero, because the integral formulation for the whole MEUC
formulation is not obtained. We will perform future research
along this direction.
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